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1940]

RECENT DECISIONS

UNFAIR COMPETITION - TRUTHFUL DISPARAGEMENT OF A TRADER'S
REPUTATION - Plaintiff sued for treble damages under the Anti-Trust Act,1
alleging that the defendants had conspired and combined to drive him out of
the securities business. Plaintiff alleged that to accomplish their purpose the

1

26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 1 et seq.
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defendants published statements as to plaintiff's cccriminal record." The facts
are not clear, but it appears from the report that the crimes in question were
committed twenty years previously, during plaintiff's youth. The trial court
instructed the jury that ccif that information was true [ as to plaintiff's criminal
record], the Better Business Bureau, regardless of its purpose in disseminating
the information, would not be liable, is not liable, because no person or firm
can be liable for telling or publishing the truth." 2 Held, that the instruction
was substantially correct; that even though the instruction did not apply to this
action the defendants would not be liable because there was not sufficient evidence to support the charge of illegality in the combination; that the avowed
purpose of the defendants, to rid the securities business of unscrupulous persons,
was not only lawful but commendable; that the only question was the illegality
of the combination. McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, (C. C. A. 2d,
1939) 107 F. (2d) 908, certiorari denied (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 807.
This court is apparently deciding that the truth of derogatory statements is
always a complete defense to an action based on the making of the statements,
regardless of the actuating motives behind the disparagement. In doing this the
court is following the supposed general rule that acts which are otherwise lawful
will not be made unlawful by a bad motive. However, there are several situations wherein it has been held that the fact that certain action, standing by
itself, is perfectly legal is not a defense where the motive for committing the act
was not a justifiable one and where it was done for the purpose of injuring
another. Common examples of such a view are: maliciously allowing percolating
water to go to waste to prevent another landowner from getting it; 8 maliciously
engaging in a rival business; 4 inducing third persons not to deal with another; 11
threatening to dismiss workmen who deal with a certain storekeeper; 6 maliciously impounding or diverting water to prevent its use by a lower riparian
owner; 1 maliciously erecting a high board fence to cut off the light and air of
the neighboring house; 8 maliciously shooting off a gun near a decoy pond to
scare away the wild fowl from which the owner of the pond derived his living; 9
Principal case, 107 F. (2d) 908 at 9II-912.
Barclay v. Abraham, 121 Iowa 619, 96 N. W. 1080 (1903); Springfield
Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895); Wyandot Club Co. v. Sells, 3
Ohio N. P. 210 (1896); Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W.
907 (1903), 92 Minn. 230, 99 N. W. 882 (1903).
4 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, ll9 N. W. 946 (1909); Dunshee v. Standard
Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W. 371 (1911); 15 R. C. L. 79-80, note 17 (1917).
See also, Delz v. Winfree, So Tex. 11-00, 16 S. W. II 1 (1891); and Mason v. Mansfield, 4 Cranch C. C. 580, 16 F. Cas. No. 9,243 (1835).
5 Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W. 737 (1900); 15 R. C. L.
76 (1917).
6 Graham v. St. Charles Street Ry., 47 La. Ann. 214, 16 So. 806 (1895), reversed 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707 (1895).
1 Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts (Pa.) 327 (1834).
8 Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N. W. 381 (1890); Kirkwood v. Finegan,
95 Mich. 543, 55 N. W. 457 (1893).
9 Keeble v. Hickeringill, II East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. u27 (1809). See also,
Post v. Munn, l South. (4 N. J. L.) 61 (1818), which held that one exercising the
2
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and the loss of a qualified privilege in cases of libel because of malice. 10 The
basic question confronting the court was whether, under such circumstances as
this, truthful disparagement should be held unlawful because the motive of the
disparagement was to injure another and drive him out of business. It has been
pointed out by one writer that in Germany, France and Switzerland truthful
disparagement, when the purpose is to injure another, constitutes unfair competition and makes one liable in damages. 11 It has been suggested by him that
a similar rule would be of benefit to American business.
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superior right of sailing could not maliciously inter!ere with the inferior right of
fishing.
10 17 R. C. L. 342, note 15 (1917), and cases there collected. On the entire
subject of the effect of malice, see 62 L. R. A. 675 (1904).
11 Wolff, "Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement," 47 YALE L. J. 1304
(1938). The principal case is also noted in 40 CoL. L. REV. 736 (1940), and 88
UN1v. PA. L. REv. 885 (1940).

